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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

FLORA H. :JicKENZIE, widow of
Owen :McKenzie, deceased,
Plaintiff,
YS.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, HAROLD J. WHITING, ~I. VERL WHITING and J.
:MELY1N HAYMOND, doing business as WHITING AND HAMMOND, Contractors, and WESTERN NATIONAL INDEMNITY
COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.

7259

Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
If this court finds any substantial evidence to support
the decision of the Industrial Commission denying com~nsation, that decision must be affirmed. Respondents
respectfully submit that the record contains more than
sufficient of such evidence, and to prove that such is
the fact they ask ,the court to consider further the testimony presented to the Commission.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Owen McKenzie was ~atally_ injured in Salt Lake
County, Utah, on Saturday,. November 29, 1947, while a
passenger in an automobile belonging to the construction
firm of Whiting and Haymond, Contractors, a partnership consisting of the defendants Harold J. Whiting,
W. Verl Whiting and J. Melvin Haymond. The deceased
was, at the time, going from his plaee of work in Garland,
Utah, to his home in Springville, Utah. His work had
stopped some three hours before the accident and he
was making the trip only to spend the week-end at home
('Tr. 43, 47). Just prior to the accident, he had worked
for the construction company at Garland for about three
months as a dump man (Tr. ·so, 82, 83).
The car in which Mc~enzie was riding on this particular trip was a Studebaker passenger car, and was
nearly always reserved for the personal use of Mr.
Haro~d Whiting, one of the partners ('Tr. 78, 83). Mr.
F. M. Cramner, the company's superintendent of the
Garland job, was driving the Studebaker. Mr. McKenzie
was injured when the car collided with another automobile at the intersection of 5th East and 39th South
Streets in :Salt Lake County.
Normally, the company's superintendent used the
company's pickup truck for his company trav,els, which
included his week-end trips from Garland to Springville
and return. He testified, and without dispute, that he
used the pickup only when he had company supplies
or equipment to bring to or from the job (Tr. 40, 41).
The Studebaker was never used by the superintendent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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except on the day of the accident ( Tr. 32). J\1r. Harold
Whiting told ~Ir. Cramner, just after quitting time at the
Garland joh on this particUlar Saturday, that he could
take the StudBbaker to Springville that day because he,
Whiting, had to stay at the scene of work for a little
while longer, and needed the pickup to haul some equipment to Springville (Tr. 34, 44, 83). The superintendent's home and the company's repair and storage shops
were located. at Springville ( Tr. 77). Whiting never told
McKenzie that he could ride with Cramner nor is there
evidence that he knew that :McKenzie was going in the
Studebaker ( Tr. 83, 92). Some of the contractors were
having a party at Springville on the foUowing Monday
night and McKenzie was invited. Harold Whiting and
Cramner both testified ·that this party was the reason for
bringing the Studebaker down to Springville to use on
Monday (Tr. 35, 81).
No evidence was presented to the Commission that
the company had any control over Mr. Cramner or Mr.
McKenzie while they rode to Springville on that fateful
Saturday, nor at any time after they quit work about
2:00 o'clock p.m. that afternoon. McKenzie and the other
employees could return to their homes by any means
they might choos·e.
Furthermore, Mr. McKenzie and Mr. Cramner, the
superintendent, were not the sole beneficiaries of Mr.
Whiting's accommodation that day. Mr. Fryer, Mr.
Taylor and Mr. Shoell, company emp[oyees, all rode
in the Studebaker, and Cramner, who was driving, made
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a stop at Salt Lake City to let out a passenger who
happened to live there (Tr. 47, 59, 67).
The deceased, Mr. McKenzie, had been employed by
the construction company as superintendent on a previous job at Malad, Idaho, ending in July of 1947. He
then had used the company's pickup truck for trips to
Springville when it was necessary for company business.
Both l\fcKenzie's wife and daughter testified that when
he brought the truck to Springville, he would pick up
machine parts and other company supplies (Tr. 15, 28).
The pickup truck was for the superintendent's own
company use, but not for his own personal convenience.
Mr. McKenzie never used this truck during the Garland
job, and Cramner testified that he, Cranmer, on~y drove
it to Springville when he had something to haul for the
company (Tr. 37, 42). The headquarters of the company were at all times located at Springville, and it was
part of the superintendent's duties to keep the job supplied with materials and parts. Mr. Cramner testified
that when he did not have such equipment to transport,
he did not use the pickup but obtained a ride to Springville, or to Garland, with other employees. On one occasion he and Mr. McKenzie rode home in Mr. Fullmer's
car (Tr. 41). He did not feel that he had any right to
use the pickup except on company business. Its chief
use was to carry parts (Tr. 40, 41). Mr. Harold Whiting
testified that no employee was permitted to use company
equipment, such as the pickup, for his own purposes, including transportation to and from work ('Tr. 91).

1;
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The testin1ony of all of the witnesses proves that
:\IcKenzie was not in a status different from the other
employees in regard to transportation to and from their
homes. Lee Taylor, another e1nployee of the company
on the Garland job, also lived at Springville. He ~testi
fied that he had ridden to and from work in the Studebaker at various tin1es, but that he had first asked ~T r.
\Yhiting if he had room. At other times he had requested
and received a ride \\ith Cramner in the pickup ( Tr. 70).
Mr. Taylor also stated that he and l\IcKenzie had ridden
home a "couple of times" with ~1:r. Harwood, a company
employee, and that Taylor contributed to the payment of
Mr. Harwood's travel expense on such trips (Tr. 69, 72).
It is without dispute that neither Harwood nor any
other worker received compensation from their employer
for such travel expense. It is also undisputed that none
of the employees, including McKenzie, were ever paid,
regardless of the place of work, for travel time to and
from home (Tr. 40, 72, 76, 77, 79).
nir. Fryer, another Garland employee, had ridden to
his home at Provo in the pickup on various week-ends,
and had also used his own car or ridden in the cars of
other employees. He once drove the pickup to 'Springville to pick up some company equipment. On that trip
he also gave another employee a ride back to the job
(Tr. 60). He corroborated Mr. Whiting's testimony that
he, Fryer, rode in ~the Studebaker on the day of the accident because Whiting had at that time offered him a
ride ('Tr. 59). When Mr. Fryer worked for the construction company at Green River, Wyoming, he had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sometimes ridden the bus to his home in Provo. He was
never reimbursed by the. company for this expense, nor
for using his own car in traveling to and from his home
( Tr. 56, 57). C1arence Shoell tes'tified that he had not
only .ridden with Fullmer and another employee named
Harwood, while traveling home from the Garland job,
but that he had sometimes used his own car at his own
expense. He had worked continuously nine years for
the company and did not know of any instance where
the company reimbursed any of the men for the expense
of operating their own ears to and from work. He .also
was a passenger in the Studebaker on the day of the
accident, but could not recall who had asked him to
ride (Tr. 60). Mr. Harold Whiting testified that any
of the men who so desired were welcome to ride with him
to and from their homes, provided he had room. However, if he was not returning to the job, the men would
have to obtain a return ride from someone else (Tr. 90,
92).

Mr. Cramner, who was cal1ed as plaintiff's own

witness, testified that it was not the policy of the company to transport employees to and from. work When
supe~intendent, he would take men ·with him in the

pickup to ~their homes in or near Springville, if he had
room, "but nobody gave ... orders to do it" ('Tr. 49).
On the trip to Springville
did not ask or require the
any company business. In
such assistance at any time
Springville (Tr. 53, 54).

on the day in question, he
assistance of McKenzie on
fact, he never did require
when he. took McKenzie to
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the time of the accident, the company employed
between twenty-five and forty men on the Garland job.
Some of them resided in Southern Idaho (Tr. 76). They
furnished their own means of transportation to and from
work, and the company never authorized or allowed them
to use any company equipment for this purpose, nor did
the company ever furnish any gas or oil or reimburse
them for such travel expense (Tr. 65, 7.6). An the employees who used their own cars appear to have had a
''share the ride'' program of some kind to equalize the
cost between them of the travel to and from their homes
(Tr. 63, 69). :Mr. Whiting estimated that about ten
men working on the Garland job lived in the Provo area
on the date in question. There is no evidence that the
company furnished any specific transportation for them
(Tr. 76). They were welcome to ride in any vehicle,
whether it belonged to the company or one of the employees, provided there was room, and provided the
company vehicle was going to Springville on company
business.
The facts surrounding the actual employment contract between the company and Mr. McKenzie further
demonstrate that he was not in the course of his employment when the fatai accident occurred. He had been
working some three months at Garland for the company,
and, like the other employees, was always paid by the
hour. McKenzie and the others would work through ~the
week until some time around Saturday noon, and then
all except one or two employees were free to go home
until the following week (Tr. 38, 79, 80). Most of them

'
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including McKenzie, while on the job lived at the scene
of the Garland work in •trailers furnished by the company, and paid for their own board (Tr. 79). On the
Saturday of the accident, Mr. McKenzie had quit work
about 2:00 o'elock, at which time his pay stopped. He
was not required to do any company work over the
week-ends, nor was his trip

~to

Springville on November

29, 1947, connected in any way with the company's business (Tr. 46, 79). His pay was the same as that of the
truck drivers and neither his nor the other employees'
compensation depended on how far they had to go to
and from their homes or what transportrution they used
(Tr. 40, 86).
Appellant's brief makes much of the question
whether McKenzie was employed at Garland as foreman.
Respondents are unable to see how this point has any
bearing on the issue now before the court. The fatal
accident was either in or out of the course of McKenzie's
employment because of the contract of employment and
not because he might have been working as a foreman
on the day he was injured.

He would not have any

right to demand company transportation merely from
the faet that he might have been foreman. The record
contains no evidence of such a privilege or right belonging to any employee, foreman or not. The record,
furthermore, presents substantia~ and very reliable
testimony that McKenzie was not a foreman at any time
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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on the Garland job, and on the day of the accident.
His employer, Harold \Yhiting, "·lw was in charge of
the work and the

In en

at Garland, testified emphatically

that :McKenzie was no foreman, but was employed only
as a dump man. His pay was the same as that of the
truck drivers (Tr. 86). In addition, there is no evidence that :JicKenzie gave any orders on the job, or tha;t
he was in charge of any men, or performed any other
duties which would fall upon a forema;n.
:McKenzie's work on the Garland job was to be
completed on the Tuesday following the accident, and
there is no testimony as to how he was to return to
Garland to finish his job.

Neither Mr. Cramner nor

Harold Whiting knew how Mr. McKenzie intended to
return (Tr. 38, 90). Mr. Camner testified that he was
returning in the pickup on Monday morning without
McKenzie (Tr. 38). These facts are proof that the
company never assumed nor was under any duty or
obHgation to provide Mr. McKenzie

wi~th

transportation

to or from his home. He had to make what arrangements he could for such travel. When, as on the date
of the accident he did obtain a ride in a company car, it
was at most an accommodation on the part of the employer.
After ~the hearing, the Commission, on August 24,
1948, found that the accident did not arise out of or in
the course of the employment of the deceased.
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·ARGU1\1ENT
I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION THAT
McKENZIE'S INJURY AND SUBSEQUENT DEATH DID
NOT ARISE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND MUST
BE AFFIRMED.

It is the establi~hed rule of this court that if any
substantial evidence exists in the record to support the
decision of the Industrial Commission, then that decision must stand. To set aside the Commission's decision,
this court must hold, as a matter of law, that there is
no such evidence. The court, in these cases, does not
weigh the conflicting evidence, or attempt to replace
the Commission as the trier of the facts. Roberts v.
lrndustrial Commission, 87 Utah 10, 47 P. (2d) 1052.
After hearing all of the testimony presented by
both parties, the Commission made its finding that the
injuries which caused Owen McKenzie's death did not
arise out of or in the course of hi~ employment. Respondents submit that under the decisions of this court, the
Commission's order denying compensation is supported
by the testimony and must be affirmed.
A general ru~e of law announced and repeatedly
affirmed by this and other courts of the country is that
while going to or from his· place of work, a worker is
not in th~ course of his employment. Here, decedent,
Owen McKenzie, was traveling from his job location at
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Garland, to his hon1e in Springville, Utah, when he
receiYed fatal injuries in an automobile accident at Salt
Lake County, Utah, some 65 miles from Garland. His
pay and working hours for the week had ended approximately three hours before the accident. When he was
fatally injured, he was riding in his employer's Studebaker passenger car being driven by his employer's
superintendent. Deceased's only reason for making the
trip was to spend the week-end at his home. Furthermore, he had on other occasions ridden home from his
place of employment in other employees' cars. He was
in the Studebaker and in the fatal accident, only beaause
he ha.ppened to reside where the car was going on oompany business and because there was room for him to
ride.
This court, under a set of facts more favorable to
the employee than in the instant case, reversed the Industrial Commission and held that a worker travelling
to his work in a company owned truck was not then in the
course of his employment. Denve.r & R. G. W. R. Co. v.
lnd.u.strial Commission, et al, 72 Utah 199, 269 P. 512.
There, the employer, a railroad, furnished a truck to
carry its track workers, including Massey, the decedent,
from the section house at Price, Utah, to their place of
work some ten miles away. This truck also brought the
men back at the end of their work day. The Railroad employed a driver for this purpose, and he supplied the car.
Four or five of the employees had made it a practice to
get on the truck at a place about three-quarters of a mile
from the section house. The other employees reached the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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section house by their own means of transportation. The
employer's foreman had observed Massey and others
riding to the section house upon the truck but had never
objected. Massey was employed by the day and was paid
by the hour, his time being computed from when he left
the section house in the morning until he returned in the
evening. Massey was killed when the truck collided with
another automobrle while carrying him and the other
workers to the section house for their day's work.
The Utah Industrial Commission found that Massey
was killed in the course of his employment. This court
held to ~the contrary and set aside the award. 'The employment did not "contemplate" transportation to the
place of work. The court ruled that the risks and
hazards of going to the section house were not within
the employer's engagement, and so did not come within
or arise out of the employment.
''Upon the facts, we think it plain that the
employment in the present case inc~uded the
transportation of the employee by the employer
only from the section house to and from his place
of work. That was the limit of the employer's
engagement both with the employee and the truck
driver. Before arrival at the section house in
the morning, neither wer;e under the control or
direction of the employer. The truck driver, in
permi'!.ting the employee to ride with him on the
truck to the section house acted entirely on his
own account and the employee was free to choose
his own way of getting to the section house without any direction or control by his employer. We
therefore ~atlt/ach (fi)O impo.rtance to the fact that
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the enlployer's foremOJn on prevli01JS OCCasvons
saw the employees riding on the tntck to the sect-ion house and said nothing abont it. We are led

bY the facts in this case to conclude that the relation or status of the parties herein as employer
and employee did not exist until the employee
reported for duty at the section house." (Italics
ours).
In our own case, the evidence does not even establish that the employer, \Vhiting and Haymond, furnished
the pickup truck for the transportation of its employees.
On the contrary, both the superintendent, Mr. Cramner,
and :Jir. Harold \\TJ!iting established without dispute
that the truck was for the pur:pose of carrying parts
from the consbruction job to the .repair shop·s at Springville and back again. McKenzie's position is even less

favorable than that of ~fassey in other respects. 'The
driver of the Massey truck was specifical'ly employed to
drive the worker to and from the job, and there was no
statement in the decision that Massey ever travelled to
the section house by any means other than the companyfurnished truck.
In Ogden Transit v. Industrial Commissvon, 95 Utah
66,79 Pac. (2nd) 17, the employer bus company furnished
a bus called the ''owl'' at the end of each day for the
convenience of its employees. They were entitled to
ride free to their homes or elsewhere. Decedent, Ferrin,
worked as a bus driver, and was killed by an automobile as he was crossing the street on his way home immediately after alighting from the "owl'' run bus.
Whi~e on this bus he had been working on some of his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bus operator's reports required by his job. Because of
the location of the bus stop, Ferrin had to cross the
street in order to reach his home. He made it a custom
of riding this S'Pecial bus home at the ·end of 'each day's
work. In setting aside the award of compensation to
Ferrin's widow, this court rejected the argument that
Ferrin came within any exception to the general rule,
such as special mission doctrine or t;he dangerous approach theory of Cudahy Packing Go., v. lndustrwl
Commission, 60 U. 161, 207 P. 148, affirmed 2'63 U. S.
418, 68 L. Ed. 366, 30 A.L.R. 532. The opinion ruled
that Konopka v. Jackson County Bo:ad Comm., 258 N. W.
429 (Mich.), on which this appellant's brief emphatically

relies, was ''not in point because there was no contract
which obligated the company to transport the employee
to and from work in the sense used in such cases."
The court aJ.so, refused to find that Ferrin's habit
of using the "owl" run gave rise to any such contractual
ob1igation:
"'There was no obligation on the employer
by contract or custom to transport Ferrin to the
regular stopping point on the east side of Washington Avenue at Cross Street. The contract of
the employee with the Company was merely that
he ·would be transported free of fare on any bus
of the company on its regular run. The company
made it convenient for employees to use the
''owl'' run by starting the busses at the car barns.
The employee was free to leave the bus at any
regular stopping place. The fact that he usually
got off at the stopping point nearest his home
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did not obligate the company to always, under
any and an circumstances, take him to that point.''
In our own case, appellant contends that McKenzie's
employer has established a custom, and had impliedly
agreed to furnish him transportation to and from McKenzie's home each week-end. In the Ogden Trans~t
decision, supra, this court gave answer to such an argument:
''Ferrin wore a badge which served as a
free pass, permitting him to ride free on any of
the busses on regular runs. He was at liberty to
board a bus or leav:e it at any regular stop....
This custom of Ferrin's cannot be transposed
into a contract obligation of the employer to deliver him at the stopping point, extending the
place of his employment to that point."
The general rule that a worker is not in the course
of his employment when travelling to and from his place
of work was first declared and applied by this court in
North Po!int Oonsol. Irr. Co. v. Industrial Commission
of Utah, et al, 61 Utah 421, 214 P. 22. In the case now
before us, appellant would have the court make an exception to this rule where none existed before. Let us see
whether the decisions of Utah's highest court justify
such a position. In the North Point case, supra, the employer's foreman told plaintiff and other employees that
he would furnish a ride to work for them if they would
meet at a certain time. The foreman was unable to get
the automobile, and plaintiff started on his bicycle to
his place of work. He was injured by a collision with a
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car before he reached his destination. In annulling the
Commission's award, this court stated:
''Here the foreman, without authority from
the plaintiff, undertook to provide transportation
for the workmen as a mere accommodation to
them, and not because plaintiff was in any way
obligated to do so.''
The court, as further authority for its ruling, quoted
a Massachusetts decision, Leveroni v. Travelers' Ins.
Co., 107 N. E. 349, as follows:
'' 'The contract of employment did not provide for transportation or that he should be paid
for the time taken in going and returning to his
place of employment, and when the day's work
had ended the employee was free to do as he
pleased. If he had chosen to use the public ways
and had been injured by a defect or passing vehicle, the administrator could not recover against
the employer because there would be no causal
connection between the conditions of employment
and the injuries suffered. ' ''
This court's observations in the above case singularly fit the situation now before the court. Appellant here
proved no agreement of any kind on the part of the
employer to furnish Mr. McKenzie with a ride to and
from his home. He received no compensation for such
travel time, and was certainly then not under his employer's direction, or furthering his own emp~oyment.
Cramner, his superintenden't, testified without contradiction that McKenzie never assisted him, nor was needed
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in any con1pany business when going to and from Springville, and particularly on the day of the accident. The
duties of his job ended when he quit work that day at
Garland.
This court has consistently followed the rule of the
North Point case, supra, while pointing out some exceptions, in a number of decisions: Co1.;·ey-Ballard Motor Co.,
et ,al v. Industrial Comm!ission, 64 Utah 1, 227 Pac. 1028;
Bountif'u{ Brick Company vs. Giles, 68 Utah 600, 251 P.
555; D. and R. G. v. Industrial Comrniission, supra; Kahn
Brothers v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 1.f5, 283
Pac. 1054; Fidelity and Casualty Company v. Industrial
Commission, 79 Utah 189, 8 Pac. (2d) 617; Roberts v. ·
Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 10, 47 Pac. (2d) 1052;
Edwards v. Indust.rial Commission, 87 Utah 127, 48 Pac.
(2d) 459; Ogden Tran~it Company v. Industr~al Commission, supra; Greer v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah
379, 279 Pac. 900; Vivag'raph v. Industr~al Commission,
96 Utah 100, 85 Pac. · (2d) 601; London Gua11antee &
Accident v. Frazee, et al, (Utah) 185 P. (2d) 284.
In the Greer case, the employee, when injured on his
way to work, was carrying a saw which he used on the
job and had taken home the previous night to sharpen.
He was struck by a car as he walked across the highway
to catch a ride with a fellow workman. The court refused
to be influenced by the fact that the employee had the
saw when killed. In upho~ding the Commission's denial
of compensation, the oprinion cites a California ·case,
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mission, et ,al, 213 P. 977. There the petitioner took some
office work home wi'th him and was injured in leaving
his home that same day to return to the office. 'This
court quoted from the decision as follows:

'' 'Exceptions to the general rule are cases
where an employe, either in his employer's or
his own time, is going to or from his place of
employment on some substantial mission for his
employer growing out of his employment. In such
cases it is he~d that the employe is within the
protection of the act. But the mission must be
the major factor in the journey or movement, and
not merely incidental thereto ; that is to say if
incidental to the main purpose of going to or from
the place of employment, it would not bring such
person under the protection of the act.' ''
The Greer case concludes with the observation that
''the dangers of the street between his home and the
stockyards were not incident to his employment, but
were dangers common to all.'' So, in the instant case,
the fact that McKenzie was in the company's car when
fatally injured did not change the nature of the dangers
of travel. Whether he had been in another employee's
car, his own car, or that of his employer, the dangers
remained the same, and furthermore, his mission or
purpose in going to Springville was on~y to reach his
home.
The Utah case of Fidelity and Casualty CompaiYIJY v.
Industrial Commission, supra, reaffirms the general rule
and reviews its exceptions enunciated by this court.
There, an employee rode a bicycle daily to and from the
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company's plant, and had definite working hours. Every
morning on his way to work he was required to pick up
films for his employer at the Semloh Hote'l and take
them to the plant at Salt Lake City. Whi le he was proceeding to the hotel on his bicycle to accomplish this
errand, he was struck and killed by an automobile some
three miles distant frOin his hotel. At the time he carried
a bag in which he would put the films. The court ruled
1

that the fact that he was on such an errand and was
carrying a bag did not take the employee out of the general rule. Said the court:
" ... At the time Edwin received the injuries
which caused his death he was in no sense under
the control of his emp;loyer. If the testimony of
Mr. Peck is to be 1believed, his employment did
not begin until he reached the Semloh Hotel. He
was at perfect liberty to take whatever course
he desired in reaching the Semloh Hotel. The
time when he was to enter upon his employment
had not yet arrived. Under the facts in this case
we are unable to perceive of any reason why the
general rule, that an employee on his way to work
is not within the protection of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, does not apply.
'' ... It may be noted that the deceased could
call at 'the Semloh Hotel without deviating from
his course of travel in coming from his home to
the plant of his employer. If the place of employment of the deceased had been at the Semloh
Hotel, there would be no doubt under the authorities that Mrs. Shufelt would not be entitled to
an award of compensation because of his death."
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This court affirmed the Commission's refusal to
grant compensation to plaintiff in Roberts v. Industrial
Oommission, supra. ·The evidence there was that employer's foreman ca!lled the deceased employee by telephone and told him to report at Soldier's Summit, Utah,
as soon as possible on a eertain day to relieve another
employee. The deceased employee, Roberts, was in the
habit of using his own car for his trips to and from his
place of work. Some evidence existed that the foreman
had told Roberts to use his own car, and it was apparent that the foreman knew the employee would use his
car. Evidence was presented that Roberts could, if he
so desired, use the train to reach the Summit. On his
way to the appointed place of work, he was killed in a
collision invo~ving his car and another automobile. Denying compensation, this court commented as follows:
''He would be called to work whenever he was
needed. The mere fact that he was urgently
needed or was told to report as soon as possib~e
on any particular occasion would not change the
nature of his employment or convert his going to
work to perform duties ordinarily performed by
him into some special errand or service."
The fact that a worker, while walking on his employer's property, was injured as he was going toward
his living quarters to get his working tools has been held
by this court as insufficient to place the accident with
the course of employment. Edwards v. Industtiial Commission, supra. The plaintiff there argued that the case
was within the Compensation Act because the employer
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controlled and owned the premises where he was hurt.
This court, in answer, said:
"~\s stated in "\Vheeler's case, 131 :.Me. 91,
159 ~\. 331, the test is not so much as to whether
the employer owns or controls the place where
the injury occurred, but rather, whether H happens on the premises where the work is to be
performed.''

This decision, like other opinions of this court, distinguishes the Cudahy and Bountiful Brick cases, supra.
Plaintiff's brief here relies on the rule of those two
cases. In the Edu)a.rds case, the court commented upon
that rule in the following language:
''The principle which appear to support these
two cases is that the approach to the employment
involved a peculiar and abnormal exposure to
danger which was annexed as a risk incident to
the employment contemplated and included in itself such risk to such dangers. In the instant case,
the injury occurred, not in the immediate ap'proach to the work, but 800 to 1,000 feet away
from the tipple.
"In the case at bar, therefore, it is quite
apparent, if we give the plaintiff the benefit of
every inference from the evidence, that he was,
as far as the record reveals, in the same situation
as an employee who lived off the company's property, who had not arrived at the place of work,
and who was not traversing over a right of way or
approach which was inherently dangerous and
which was either the sole means of approach or
the natural, practical, customary, and convenient
approach as compared to all other approaches.''
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In our own situation, it cannot be maintained by any
stretch of logic that McKenzie was injured while passing
over a right of way inherently dangerous; or that such
right of way was an immediate approach to the place of
work or that its dangers were within the employment
contemplated by the parties to the employment contract.
To so hold, would place every foot of roadway travelled
by McKenzie and the other employees in going to and
from work, within the Cudahy and Bowntiful Brick rule.
In the V itagrla;ph case, supra, this court answered
any contention of this plaintiff that McKenzie, when .
injured, was not only going home but was serving his
employer. That opinion, in holding against an employee
who was taking some work reports home at the time of
the accident, ruled that:
'' ... To establish liabiHty the inference must
be permissible that even though the private errand
were cancelled the trip would have been made.''
Defendants agree that the contract of employment
may contemplate the furnishing of transportation. Such
transportation may, under certain circumstances, be part
of the consideration for which the worker accepts the
job. But such was not McKenzie's situation. No evidence is in the record that he or any other employee at
the Garland job or elsewhere was ever told or made to
understand that the company would furnish ~transpor
tation to and from the workers' homes. No emp1oyee
was shown to have received reimbursement for such
travel expense. Some ten of the Garland employees,
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including :J[cKenzie, lived in the Springville-Provo area,
and while any of them was welcome to ride home in a
company autonwbile that was g·oing on company business (which included driving nir. Whiting's Studebaker
to Springville), such transportation was not furnished
them by the company as a contract right or under any
custom or agreement that they could demand a ride
whether or not a car was going on such company business.
The employees who lived in :Malad and at other poin ts
north of Garland, never rode to or from their homes in
company transportation or at company expense because
there were no company cars having company errands in
that area. The fact that ~IcKenzie and certain of the
others happened to live in the Springville area, where
the employer's shops were located and the company officials lived, does not change an accommodation into a
contract right.
1

Such rides home as the Garland employees received
in the company's vehicles were a gratuity or accommodation on the part of the employer, and in this regard,
McKenzie cannot be placed in a class apart from the
other men. The nature of such occasional transportation is well il1ustrated in Goldsworthy v . .Schreiber et al,
(Wis.), 250 N. W. 427. The facts were very similar to
those of the present case. Goldsworthy, as a contractor,
employed workers on a building contract about 37 miles
from Beloit, Wisconsin. About fourteen men, including
the deceased employee, Schreiber, resided in Beloit but
spent the week in camp at the scene of the work. The
employer supplied board and room. 'Some of the other
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

men lived elsewhere, and aN were employed from Monday morning to Saturday noon. The men could remain
at the camp over the week-end, but they were then obliged
to do their own cooking. The evidence is that only one
man at a time remained at the camp over the week-end.
The employer ran a truck to Beloit each week-end, leaving Saturday afternoon. The employer himself testified
that he had told the men that there would Halways be
a truck coming back on Saturday night and back down
on Sunday night.'' It was usual and customary for a
number of the men, including Schreiber, residing in
Beloit to ride in this truck in order to spend Sunday at
their homes. One Sunday evening, however, Schreiber
returned to the camp in a car of a co-emp~oyee. ·This
arrangement was made with the knowledge and consent
of the employer. On ·this trip Schreiber was fatally injured in an automobile accident. The Wisconsin court
held that the employer's transportation arrangement did
not create an obligation resting upon him by virtue
of the terms of the contract of employment. ''Our fundamental inquiry is whether he had a right to transportation by his employer." The court held that he had
no such right.
"But here the employees were maintained
in a camp established at the works. They were
privileged to stay in the camp over Sunday if they
so desired, hut they chose to return to their homes
at the week-end and spend Sunday with their
families. It will not be so readily inferred (if
the inference be permissible at all) that the transportation furnished by the employer under such
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circu1nstances was in the discharge of a contractual obligation, because the occasion therefor did
not arise from the necessities of the employment.
It was merely for the gratification of the employees.
"The transportation so furnished was not in
any manner a necessity for the prosecution of the
employer's business. Not all of his employees
came from Beloit, and the.re lis no suggestion in
the record that transportation was furnished to
any except Beloit employees. Neither does it
appear that it was in any wise necessary in order
to enable the employees to return to their home.
It appears from the record that there was a bus
and other transportation from Beloit to points in
convenient proximity to the camp. It also appears
that, although the employer's truck was availablle
for transportation, some of the employee's went
back and forth in their own cars." (Italics ours.)
The Wisconsin court based its decision upon the
nature of the transportation furnished in the employer's
truck and not upon the fact that the employee was killed
while riding in a car of another emp~oyee. The court
a1so made a distinction, not often drawn, between the
case of daily transportation for the employees, and a
weekly provision by the employer for the men's travel
to· and from home.
1

Appellant, in her brief, advances the Washington
case of Venho v.· Ostr1ander Railway and Timber Company, 52 P. (2d) 1267, to support her argument. That
decision had to do with the employer's furnishing its
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
dent of their employment.'' That same court, in a later
decision, established that its ruling there would not apply
to such a situation as now before this court. In Waod
v. A. H. Chambers Packing Company, (Wash.) 68 P. (2d)
221, plaintiff, Wood, was employed by the highway department a few miles from his home. The workers
assembled at 'the employer's office each morning to be
transported to their work in the department's light truck.
This car was used daily to carry the men and their tools
to and from their place of work. The truck was kept at
night in a garage some 'two miles from the office, and in
the town where Wood lived. He and other workmen,
living near him, generally rode in the truck from the
garage to the office, but were not required to do so.
Some of them used their own cars or rode to and from
the garage with other employees. Whi le returning in
the truck from the department's office to his residence,
Wood was injured in an intersection collision about
· twenty minutes after his work day had ended. The sole
question before the court was whether plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment. The Washington
Supreme Court ruled that he was not so injured. The
opinion refused to place Wood within the exception of
the V enho case, supra. In fact, it cited that decision as
1

authority for the general rule that a workman going to
or coming from the place of work is not in the course of
his employment.
".Appellant (Wood) comes squarely within
the rule above stated, and not within the exception
thereto. The automobile in which he was riding
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at the time of the accident was not furnished as
a part of appellant's contract of employment, nor
was its use by him made, at all, for the /benefit of
his employer to facilitate the progress of the work.
It was merely an available means of transportation adopted by appellant for his own accommodation.''
Another Washington opinion in point, and cited with
approval in both the V enho and W:ood cases, supra, is
Hama Hama Logging Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 288 P. 655.
There the logging company furnished a track speeder
for the chief purpose of carrying its employees from
the work camp to the nearby town on week-ends for their
personal business. It appears that the company's railroad from camp was the on~y way to reach town. Appellant, Spears, worked regularly at the logging camp, and
lived there during the week. His work week ended on
Sat~rday

night. He was injured while riding to town
on the speeder the following Sunday morning, and evidently for personal reasons. It should also be noted that
h1s injuries were 'Caused by a collision between the
speeder and the employer's logging train on the company's premises. The court ruled, however, that Spears
was not furthering the interests of his empiloyer when
injured, and denied his claim.
"Those injuries were sustained on an occasion when time was his own. He was making the
trip from the camp on his own time and for his
own personal business or pleasure. He was not
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working. No one had any supervision over him.
He was not receiving pay from his employer on
the day he was injured.
''The logging company merely permitted or
authorized rts employees to ride on the speeder
free of charge, as a convenience to the employees
and not in the furtherance of its business. This
is not a case wherein the employer has agreed to
transport its employees to and from their work
daily as a part of its contract with them. Here
the employee sustained an injury when he was
not performing any duty that he owed to his employer. The employer had no control over him
whatsoever. The trip on which the employee had
started was one of choice and was being made for
persona~ reasons solely. The logging company's
transporta:tion facilities afforded opportunity to
the employee to enjoy periods of rest outside of
the camp.''
The Washington court in Thompson v. Department
of Labor ,and Industries, 116 P. (2d) 372, again affirmed
the H ama H ama decision, supra, when it denied workman's compensation to parents of a boy killed while
operating his employer's motorcycle. At the time, he
was riding to his home for lunch after a morning's work.
He was a delivery boy, and his employer testified that
he was to make deliveries on his way to and from his
home, whether at lunch time, or at night. He was permitted to use the motorcycle for his travels home, and
kept it at his residence each night. His employer paid
all its operating expenses, and paid the boy a percentage
of the profits. The court ruled that the case was no
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exception to the ru'le applicable to accidents occurring
to an employee on his way to or from work.
·'The Hama Hama case announces the general rule in this state, and the Yenho case announces the exception to the general rule.
'' "\Ye believe there is a clear distinction between cases such as the Venho case, where the
employe is injurd while using or riding in a conveyance furnished or made available by the employer, and such use is necessary for, or an incident to, the furtherance of the employer's business, and the instant case, where the- employee is
permitted, for his own convenience alone, to use
a vehicle furnished by the employer.''

The rule of the Hama, Hama decision has again
been invoked by the Washington Supreme Court in the
recent case of McCarty v. King County Medical Service
Corp., 175 P. (2d) 653.
The Supreme Court of California has cited the
Hama Hama case, supra, as one "clearly and correctly
reasoned to a like conclusion with ours." In Graf et al
v. Montecito County Water District, 34 P. (2d) 138,
plaintiffs were employed on the construction of a dam
and lived in camp at the work site. The company furnished a train on Saturday nights to carry workers from
the camp to Santa Barbara to visit relatives, or for other
personal matters. The California court ruled that an
accident which occurred to an emp~oyee while on such a
trip did not occur in the course of his employment.
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In another California decision, Boggess et ·al v. InAccident Commission, et ,al, 169 Pac. 75, the facts
are again very similar to those of the instant case.
Fenner, employed regularly as a miner, was given leave
to go to the town of Williams, some 30 miles from the
mine on some personal business. He was to return on
the local stage when he had finished his affairs. In Wil~iams he met his mine superintendent, who informed
him that if he would assist in loading some mine trucks
there, he could ride back to the mine that day. He did
so, and while on the return trip was injured. The fact
was that at the time Fenner was employed, "it was
understood . . . that he was to do any work he was directed to do, and it occasionally happened that miners
were detailed to do work of this character.'' In setting
aside the Commission's award for the employee, the
California court commented:

drustri~al

''His going to the mine on the truck, instead
of by stage, was arranged merely as a matter of
convenience to him. It was no part of his service.
He was still in the process of returning to the
mine in the pursuance of the arrangement by
which he had left it temporarily. He has no more
right under the law to claim compensation from
Boggess for the injury which happened to him
on the journey to the mine on ·the truck than he
would have had if he had been riding on the stage
as he first intended."
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also ruled that
transportation in a company-owned vehicle from the
place of work to the employee's home, in a situation like
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j[cKenzie's, is a mere convenience and does not place
the trip within the· course of employment under the Compensation Law. In Erickson v. St. Paul City Ry. Oo.,
169 N. W. 532, plaintiff was a member of the power
company's crew engaged in repairing power lines around
St. Paul, Minnesota. The company provided a truck,
with a driver, in which the equipment used by the crew
was carried and upon which crew members moved from
one point on the line to another. The company itse1f
did not convey the crew from their homes to their places
of work and return. However, the driver kept the truck
at his residence and on his daily trips to and from work
made it a practice of picking up some of the crew.
'':Members of the crew going in the direction tra¥eled
by the truck were at liberty to ride ·on it if they wished,
and availed themselves of this privilege whenever they
found it convenient to do so.''
Wh1le returning home on the truck after work, the
pla~tiff was injured in a traffic accident. The court
determined that the accident did not arise in the course
of the employment.
"In the case at bar it will be noted that ·the
accident happened after the employees had completed their day's work and had left their place
of employment and while they were proceeding
toward their restpective homes. AHhough they
were riding on the truck of their employer, it
clearly appears that their contract of employment
imposed no obligations upon the emp1oyer to
transport 'them to or from the place of work and
that they were merely riding as licensees to ~erve
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their own convenience. Their service for the day
had terminated; they had left the place where
such service had been performed and were no
longer engaged in performing any service for
their employer."
In No·rwood v. Tellico, 244 8. W. 490 (Tenn), 24
A.L.R. 1227, the employee himself, in a negligence action,
took the position that he was not in the course of employment when injured while riding home gratis on his
employer's logging train. It was the custom of the employees to ride to town from their camp at the end of
the week in order to receive their pay checks. They
usually rode the logging train each way. Plaintiff was
returning from town when injured by what he claimed
was the train operator's negligence. He had gone to
town this certain week-end to see his father. His work
was not to be resumed until the morning after the accident occurred. The court recognized that transportation may be furnished by the employer as an incident
of the emp1oyment, and pursuant to agreement. But
not so here. Observed the court:
"It is true that he was riding on one of the
defendant's trains, going to his home, but this
was not an incident to his employment. He was
returning from a social visit to his father. His
employment with defendant did not begin until
the foUowing day. He did not owe defendant any
duty while thus returning to his home, and defendant had no control whatever over him. The
trip to his father's home, of which the return was
a part, was not an incident to his employment
but was purely personal.''
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The above Tennessee case cites as authority for its
decision, Rausch v. Standard Sh ipbuildl:ing Oorporotion,
181 X.Y.S. 513, and the English case of D·avi.es v. Rltymney I ron Tr orks Co., 16 Times L. R. 329, 2 W. C. C. 22.
In the first ease, the K ew York court held that a shipyard
worker was not in the course of employment at the time
he was injured on his way home from work. The shipyards were located on an island, and the employer, at
the request of its workers, had chartered a ship to transport them to and from the island. The employer was
reimbursed for this expense by the United States Government. Boats of other concerns made the trip but
they were inadequate. The deceased worker had used
the company-furnished transportation for some time
before he was fatally injured on board in a ship accident while returning home at the end of the week's work.
The work day of the employees, including deceased, began and ended at the island. The court refused to find
that the employee's death arose out of or in the course
of his employment:
"Concededly plaintiff's intes•tate's hours of
work had ·expired, his work for the day and the
week was over, and he had received his pay therefor; he was being conveyed in a boat hired or
chartered by the defendant, and which expense
in no wise figured in the pay or wages of the
plaintiff's intestate. To say that the death of
plaintiff's intestate arose out of and in the course
of his employment, and within the precincts of
his then or theretofore employer, the Standard
:Shipbuilding Corporation, seems to be extending
the compass of the act to even a greater degree
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than in any case cited or which has come to the
notice of this court.''
The English decision of Davies v. Rhymney Iron
Works, supra, held that a workman injur,ed when returning home on a train furnished by the employer for the
convenience of the men, was not at the time in the course
of his employment. In both that case and the Rwusch
case, supra, the fact that the employer furnished transportation specifically for the workers did not change the
result. In the present case, we do not have this added
factor to aid petitioner. The record contains no proof
whatever that McKenzie's employer furnished him or
any other employee transportation to and from work.
The superintendent's use of the pickup or the Studebaker
in which he incidentally allowed various employees to
ride to their homes, cannot be so construed. Petitioner
does not contend that if McKenzie had lived north of
the Garland job he would have ridden home in the company's automobile. On the contrary, the evidence establishes without dispute that he, like the other employees,
always would have had to depend on som·e other means
of transportation.

J!
:Ia

II
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT DECEDENT
RODE IN THE EMPLOYER'S AUTOMOBILE ONLY BY
PERMISSION.

Appellant's brief strenuously argues the question
whether McKenzie obtained permission to ride home in
the company automobile on the day he was fatally inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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jured. Appellant asserts that the Commission eommitted
error in finding that the deeeased obtained sueh permission and, of his own volition, chose to leave his plaee
of employment for his home in Springville. Respondents submit that there is substantial evidence to support
this finding. Can it be said that McKenzie was entitled
to ride in the company car as of right~ Neither the
superintendent, the employer, Mr. Harold Whiting, nor
any other employee who testified knew of any such right.
Having no such right, :McKenzie could only have ridden
home as he did with the permission of the employer,
either expressed or implied. The permission need not
have been expressly given on the day in question, but
could have been given on a prior date, or by course of
praetice or conduct. The decisions whieh respondents
have above presented illustrate that such permission can
be so given, and amounts to a mere accommodation or
gratuity on the part of the employer. These decisions
also prove that a finding by the Commission of such permission is not at all a prerequisite to the ultimate finding
that the injury did not arise out of or occur in the course
of the employment. In many of these cases which reJ
spondents have cited, the employer furnished regular
transportation for the employees, and the employees
used it. And yet the courts refused to bring the parties
within the Workmen's Compensation Law. The deeisions
do not rely upon or even refer to, a finding that the
employee obt~ined permission at any time to so ride.
Appellant's brief, further, admits that such a finding is
1
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not conclusive as to decedent's status at the time of the
accident.
III
APPELLANT'S CASES

In her brief, appellant rellies upon a number of
decisions to sustain her contention that the Commission
erred in denying her an award. Those cases, however,
can be readily distinguished from the case at bar. In
most of them, as in the Utah case of London GiMarontee
v. Frazee, supra, the court was bound to sustain the
ruling -of the trial court or of the Commission in favor
of the. employee if it found substantial support in the
evidence. In this McKenzie case that situation is reversed. Here the court must sustain the Commission's
decision against petitioner unless its decision is arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, in mos t of the
appellant's cases, transportation was determined to have
been furnished as a necessary part of the job, or under
an implied contract giving the right to demand the ride.
The transportation was also avai'lable to all of the employees, and was nearly always the only means of travel
used. In some of the appellant's cases the employer
either told the workers that transportation would be
furnished, or he directed them to use his transportation.
:Bometimes, as in the Frazee case, decided by this court
in 1947, the fact was established that the employee was
paid for the time consumed in travel to his job, and that
the employment contract "contemplated that Fraze·e was
1
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to be an employee while on defendant's time en route
to (his place of work)." Frazee, it will be recallled, was
also furnished a pass on his employer's trains. Another
important distinction between that case and the problem
now before the court is that there the employer testified
that the contract did include travel time.
The United States Supreme court decision of CardiUo v. Liberty Mutual Insuromce Company, 330 U. S.
469; 67 Sup. Ct. 801; 91 L. Ed. 1028, quoted in appellant's
brief, does not fit our present case. There, the applicable
federa'l statute, the Longshoreman's Act, provided that.
jurisdiction under the Workman's Compensation Act for
the District of Columbia '' 'is to be presumed in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary'." The
act applies to the injury or death of an employee '' irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs.''
The Supreme Court not only emphasized these statutory
provisions, but observed that ''the Deputy Commissioner's findings as. to jurisdiction are entitled to great
weight and will be rejected only when there is apparent
error." The Deputy Commissioner, before whom the
hearing had been conducted, awarded compensation on
his finding that the injury arose out of the course of
employment. The court also noted that the agreement
between the 'Uinvon ~and ~the employer required the Zatter
to fur'nish transport:at~on for its employees, and two
dollars was paid to decedent tor this purpose at the time
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he was killed while driving his car home t~om work.
The peculiar facts in this case of our federal Supreme
Court certainly make that decision no authority for
plaintiff's claim that Owen McKenzie's injuries, and
death therefrom, arose out of or in ·course of his employment.
CONCLUSION
The uncontradicted evidence in this case is that the
decedent when fatally injured was traveling to Springville, Utah, at his own wish, for the sole purpose of
reaching his home after a week's work at Garland, Utah.
His pay time and work time, which were very definite,
had, like that of the other emp[oyees, sto'prped some three
hours prior to the accident. McKenzie and his fellow
workers had to make what arrangements they could for
transportation to and from their place of work, and they
received no compensation or reimbursement from their
employer for the time or money so spent. On various
occasions, McKenzie had used a means of travel to his
home other than in a company owned car. The only
conclusion permissable from the evidence is that when
McKenzie rode home in his employer's automobile, he
did so only because he happened to live in Springville.
If he had lived north, east or west of Gadand on the
day of the accident, he would not have gone home in a
company car, and he would not have been in the accident.
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His ride in the Studebaker that fateful day was only
the result of an accommodation on the part of the employer. Respondents therefore respectfully submit that
the accident causing Owen ~fcKenzie 's death did not
arise out of or in the course of his employment. The
decision of the Commission denying compensation is not
arbitrary or capricious but is supported by ample and
undisputed testimony, and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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